MAANPUOLUSTUSKURSSIYHDISTYS

Security Challenges in the High North

 

Introduction

It is a pleasure to address such a distinguished audience here at the National Defence Course Association. I very much appreciate this opportunity to speak on the topical issue of security challenges in the High North. The Arctic has always been important to Norway.We have long traditions of exploring and utilizing this area. In 2005, the Norwegian government declared that the High North should be Norway´s most important strategic priority area in the years to come. This declaration was followed by a strategy document in 2006, explaining the Government’s policy and ambitions for development of this region.

During the cold war, the High North was highly militarised. It was an area of immense strategic importance and home to the naval element of the Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear deterrence. Then around 1990, the situation changed completely and cold war tension was replaced by détente. Our worries of a total war between NATO and the Warszaw Pact was replaced by worries of decaying weapons in our immediate neighbourhood, and the threat of nuclear accidents in North-West Russia.

Today, the High North can be described as an area of low tension, moderate military activity and constructive dialogue between Arctic nations, including Russia. Combined with this overall positive trend, new challenges have emerged, related to issues like climate change, new maritime transport routes, energy security, search and rescue, and sustainable exploitation of resources. Although, mostly civilian in nature, these challenges may also have security implications and have rapidly become a dominant factor in the Norwegian government’s policy agenda.

Norway welcomes new commercial opportunities in the High North, and we must take advantage of these new prospects.At the same time we must be realistic. Operating and sailing in the Arctic is still very challenging. Despite the renewed attention to the region and to the new opportunities associated with it, we don´t see any race for resources, contrary to what many people seem to think. Economic activity is developing slowly.

Estimates indicate that most of the anticipated oil- and gas reserves are located within established exclusive economic zones. Exploiting these resources are however costly and the future prospects for the oil and gas market will determine if the huge investments required can pay off. Recent knowledge of considerable shale oil and gas reserves in North America and elsewhere could actually make investments in the Arctic far less profitable. It will be very interesting to see what will happen in this area the coming years.

I will continue by first giving you an overview of what I see as the most important factors that may influence the security situation in the next ten years. Then I will look beyond that timeframe, and offer my view on which challenges we may face in a long term perspective. Last, I will give you some of my thoughts on Norway´s and our Armed Forces´ role in the High North, and what I believe should be the role of NATO.

Security challenges in a short term perspective

The strategic importance of the High North today is considerably different from what it was during the Cold War. The interest is however increasing, mainly because of new opportunities stemming from the receding ice coverage in the Arctic Ocean, but also because of the region’s strategic military importance to Russia. After a long period of stagnation and decay, Russia is devoting considerable resources to modernising its military forces and increasing its capabilities.

The role of Russia

As neighbours in the North, Norwegians have long traditions of interaction with the Russians. For two hundred years, in the 18th and 19th Century, people from Northern Norway and Northern Russia were engaged in an extensive trade along the coast, the so called Pomor trade. The Russian revolution brought dramatic change and you all know what the situation was like during the Cold War.

Today the relationship with Russia is good and constructive. For several years, the main drivers have been the common opportunities and challenges we share in the High North. We have recently resolved the one remaining border issue in the Barents Sea. The recent ratification of the delimitation agreement between Russia and Norway (2011) is perhaps the single most important achievement in Norwegian foreign policy in recent years. It took 40 years of negotiation, but the result is an excellent example of a pragmatic approach to solving disputes and has removed a potential source of future conflict between the two countries.

Russia and Norway have also over time established efficient fishery control regimes in our respective national waters. Still, we disagree on the status of the fishery protection zone surrounding the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard. This has led to a few incidents over fishing rights over the years, where the Norwegian Coastguard has taken Russian trawlers under arrest. Prosecution under Norwegian Law has usually lead to heavy fines. Despite the disagreement, these incidents have not spilled over to other areas of cooperation, or escalated into more serious disputes. To me this is a good example of a relationship that works and where pragmatic politics takes priority over underlying problems.

In the military field, we work closely with Russia in a number of areas. Since 1996 we have signed and executed annual bilateral military work plans, which gradually have expanded in scope. We now conduct joint exercises in areas like search and rescue at sea, and naval operations. The small, but important bilateral naval exercise Pomor includes elements from marine-, sea- and air forces. In the future this exercise will be conducted bi-annually, alternating with the US-Russia-Norway tri-lateral naval exercise Northern Eagle.

I believe that co-operation, increased transparency and insight build trust. Trust, that will help us avoid unnecessary misunderstanding and suspicion. Common training and exercises are also important if we want our forces to be able to work together in a crisis.

Based on what I have said, we consider the High North as a stable area with low tension, and with a relationship to Russia characterised by constructive cooperation. At the same time, the High North is an area of considerable strategic importance to Russia. It is the main testing ground for new weapon systems and frequently used for training and exercises. Also, it contains huge port areas with access to ice free waters all year around, and Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrence has its home base here.

Looking at our neighbour today, I see a country with significant military potential, re-building its capabilities from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some of these capabilities are located only a few kilometres from our common border.Russian military reform has been considerable over the past years. The country is investing heavily in its armed forces, and large-scale exercises are conducted regularly. This process is clearly seen as an important part of re-establishing Russia as a global power with regional responsibilities and interests to defend.

Like most countries in the West, the Russian Armed Forces are being transformed to meet new security challenges: Old and unreliable equipment is replaced by new and more modern weapon systems. Russia plans large increases in defence spending in the coming years. Investments in new equipment are intended to raise the percentage of modern equipment from 10-15 % in 2011 to 70 % in 2020. President Putin has earlier declared that the nuclear deterrent, naval vessels, aircraft, air defence systems, command, control and reconnaissance systems will be prioritised.

Over the past years we have seen increased air activity from Russia, flying long-range bombers westwards along the Norwegian coast. We follow this activity closely. Our F-16 fighters are scrambled to identify and monitor this traffic. This is part of NATO Air Policing mission, performed by national aircraft under NATO command. We do not regard this air activity as directed against Norway, but as part of Russia’s strategic training and demonstration of capability.

Russia published in 2008 an Arctic Strategy for the period up to 2020. Here, the Northern Fleet is given the responsibility of protecting Russian oil and gas installations in the Russian Arctic. Russia is also planning to establish a so called Arctic Brigade on the Kola-peninsula. We believe this in reality means an upgrade of the current 200 Motorized Infantry Brigade at Pechenga with new equipment and capabilities, rather than the establishment of a new brigade. The strategy indicates in general increased interest and ambitions for Russian presence in the High North in the years to come.

In working with Russia, we see a tendency that they favour bilateral cooperation and security agreements from multinational organisations like EU and NATO.For Norway however, the NATO Alliance remains the cornerstone of our security. Although we have a good bilateral relationship with Russia, we try to promote contacts and activities within a wider multilateral framework. The NATO-Russia Council provides an excellent framework for increased confidence building and cooperation, but this relationship continues to be marked by high policy strife.

For Norway, Allied interest and presence in the High North is an essential part of our security thinking. By this, I mean regional knowledge, situational awareness, intelligence sharing, and regular training and exercise activity. We are in particular engaged in arranging for training and exercises in North Norway with Allies and close partners. Our closest non-NATO partners are of course Finland and Sweden. The presence of other NATO-countries in the High North could also facilitate increased cooperation with Russia, but this view is unfortunately not shared in Moscow.

In spite of this reservation towards working with regional security organisations, Russian foreign policy statements and strategy documents regularly emphasise the primary role of international law and multilateralism in international relations. This view is also reflected in the Russian Arctic strategy, where maintaining the Arctic as an area of peace and cooperation is highlighted as one of four main policy aims.

International law and delimitation issues

An appropriate legal framework is vital for constructive co-operation in any region. All five Arctic littoral states: Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark and Norway issued in 2008 a joint statement, known as the Ilulissat Declaration, committing them to settle territorial claims diplomatically, using existing legal mechanisms. It is therefore expected that delimitation issues will continue to be solved peacefully in the future. There is no reason to believe that individual nations will act without regard to international law. Nevertheless, we should not completely discard potential sources of friction between Arctic states related to Russia´s claims to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). These claims, to be substantiated by end 2013, could grant Russia sovereign rights to resources under the seabed up to 350 nm from its shoreline.

There is also potential for friction between Arctic littoral states on the issue of maritime border delimitation.Such issues exist between the United States and Canada, between Denmark and Canada, as well as between Russia, Canada and Denmark. However, joint efforts to map the seabed in more detail are on-going. Given the Ilulissat Declaration, it is unlikely that these issues will develop into any serious security challenge involving the use of force between states.

To sum up, I would say that in a short term perspective, the security challenges we could face will be caused by other factors than those directly related to the consequences of climate change. They could rather be related to unexpected and provocative military activity and to the possibility of deteriorating relations between Russia, the United States and NATO. Although unlikely, the possibility of friction related to disagreement over the right to resources and to border delimitation issues can neither be completely discarded.

Security challenges in a long term perspective

In a long-term perspective, beyond the next 10 years, as the polar icecap has receded even more, we will be facing other security challenges as the region is becoming more and more accessible.

One of the driving forces of the renewed focus on the High North is climate change, but most likely we will not see the full consequences of this change until 20-30 years from now. We will then be faced with new opportunities for commercial activity and exploitation of natural resources. Less ice opens up for new and shorter transportation routes between the Atlantic and the Pacific. It also entails the possibility of extended fisheries and more tourism. The increased global demand for energy will most likely make it more profitable to exploit oil and gas fields in the Arctic. It is also likely that Russia will continue to strengthen its presence and position in the region.

In a long-term perspective, we will be facing alternative routes of transportation between North America, Europe and Asia. New sea lines of communication have already opened up through the North East passage, and Russia in particular, is eager to open up the Northern Sea Route for trade purposes. In some years we will also see routes straight across the North Pole. The shortest passage for sea transport from Asia to Europe will thus go via the Barents- and the Arctic Ocean. This will reduce the distance between Asia and Europe by more than 7000 kilometres, which is a significant reduction in sailing time.

New and shorter sailing routes lead to completely new prospects for co-operation, both between nations bordering the Arctic and other interested nations. It means that China may become an important future shipping nation in the High North.

When the icecap is receding, new opportunities for exploiting the rich energy reserves under the Arctic Seabed will emerge. According to some studies, the Arctic has one of the largest unexplored petroleum reserves in the world. There are uncertainties about the actual figures, but the relative importance of the High North as an energy supplier is growing. It has to be said however, that the development of shale oil and gas fields elsewhere in the world, could severely affect the profitability of petroleum extraction in the Arctic.

In addition to oil, gas and mineral resources, the Arctic contains one of the largest fish stocks in the world. There are also substantial mineral resources on shore in the region, and we will probably see a considerable increase in transportation in and out of the area, generating increased economic activity.

The danger of large scale military confrontation in the High North seems unlikely, even in a long-term perspective. No actor however, would probably exclude the potential of limited conflicts or episodes caused primarily by disputes over natural resources, first and foremost energy. There is always a possibility that international competition for energy reserves may develop into military confrontation, especially in case of global energy shortages. To completely reject the possibility of war between states in the future would in any case be naive, that much have we learned from history.

Increased great power rivalry and international spill over

In a long-term perspective, broader geopolitical problems could also impact on established cooperation in the Arctic. These potential problems will most likely have to do with the engagement of the region´s one global superpower the United States, its relationship to Russia and the latter´s ambitions as a key Arctic state. How the Arctic states decide to handle China´s increasing interest in the North will also be of great importance.

The United States, in particular, is promoting the idea of an open Arctic Council, whereas Russia vigorously defends the privileged position of Arctic littoral states. Russian actors seem to have grown accustomed to the idea of an Arctic regional cooperation where the Arctic littoral states are in the driver´s seat. Consequently, they remain uncomfortable in considering the Arctic as a zone for international relations, with involvement of non-Arctic states and organisations like China and the EU.

The strategic importance of the High North is recognised not only by the Arctic states themselves, but also by nations like China. The role of China and the future relations between the United States, China and Russia will surely be of great importance for the security situation in the High North in a long-term perspective.

Another factor which cannot be totally ignored is the persistent danger of terrorism. This threat is likely to increase as commercial activity expands in the region. Recent events in Algeria show that attacks on large petroleum installations is possible and that Al Qaida affiliated groups is able to execute such plans. However, to do this in the Arctic is another matter. The operational and logistic complexity of such an undertaking is huge. I would say that attacks against on-shore installations are more likely than attacks off-shore, but the most exposed targets are probably ships. Valuable cargo on merchant liners and cruise ships could be tempting targets for capable terrorist groups.

Norway and the role of the Norwegian Armed Forces

As I have mentioned earlier, the security situation in the High North is currently stable and the tension is low. It is in everyone’s interest to maintain this status in the future. Military presence and routine military activity do not threaten this stability. On the contrary, it can contribute to predictability and stability. Moreover, military assets constitute important capacities with regard to surveillance, situational awareness and support to search-and-rescue operations. In the case of Norway, the bulk of our search and rescue helicopters are operated by the Air Force, and our Coast Guard organisation is part of the Armed Forces.

Norway, like the other Arctic States, has several interests to protect in the High North. Considering the potential for security challenges in the region, routine military presence is an important element in safeguarding these interests, and to maintain security and stability for everyone operating in this hash environment. There is no threat to Norwegian territorial integrity today. I believe that shared interests among the Arctic states by far outweigh any conflict of interest.

The Norwegian Armed Forces therefore play an important role in the High North. They provide intelligence and surveillance, exercise sovereignty, authority and contribute to crisis management. We must be sure that we have forces capable of preventing and managing incidents and limited crisis situations on Norwegian territory and adjacent areas. Hence, we are constantly investing in our defence.

Since we are controlling an ocean area 6-7 times the size of our mainland, we have especially focused on our Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard. We have recently invested in new frigates, coastal corvettes and coast guard vessels. The Coast Guard continuously exercises authority in northern waters, and executes both military and civilian tasks. Our upcoming acquisition of new fighter aircraft, the F-35, is a part of this overall investment. I expect the F-35 to be an equally successful weapon system for the future as the F-16 has been for more than thirty years. We have also started the process of evaluating our submarine capability post 2020. Furthermore, the old operational headquarters structure was closed down and a new national joint operational headquarters was established north of the Arctic Circle by the city of Bodø underlining the importance of the High North.

Our National Armed Forces are primarily built and organised for the defence of Norway. Additionally, they are dedicated to the collective defence of NATO member states. The capabilities of our forces are however well suited for operations abroad. They are flexible, interoperable with those of our Allies, small in numbers, but high in quality.

I am satisfied that we have been able to take tough, but necessary decisions for the transformation our national defence sector in favourable economic times, and not being forced to make dramatic cuts in the structure out of necessity.

During the Cold War, the border between Norway and the Soviet Union represented NATO’s frontline on the northern flank. The security threat was very real. Today, both the Soviet Union and the threat of invasion from the East are gone.But our border with neighbouring Russia is still the same. You may already now, that this Schengen border is guarded by military soldiers in close cooperation with– and under civilian police authority.

Of the five Arctic littoral states, four are NATO Allies; the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway. Russia is a NATO-partner. The states agree that Arctic issues should be discussed and resolved in the Arctic Council, except issues of national security and security policy. Russia sees no role for the EU or NATO in the Arctic, and today, NATO activities in the region are quite limited. From a Norwegian perspective, I would like to stress that NATO’s interest and presence is legitimate and not targeted at any particular nation.

I. A role for NATO?

So what about NATO?Is there a role for the Alliance in the High North? For me, the answer is yes. Norway´s main aim is that NATO remains relevant and is the primary organisation for dealing with the full range of security issues of all its member states. Clearly, with four Arctic littoral states being members, it would be remarkable if this region was exempted from NATOs area of interest. A renationalisation of Allies’ security policy must be avoided. Therefore, the Alliance must play a more credible and visible role in raising NATO’s profile also in the High North. Referring to the need for renewed focus on security challenges in and around Allied territory, regular training and exercise activities in a NATO framework would demonstrate collective solidarity.

NATO presence on the territory of Allies should not contribute to increased tension. On the contrary, it should contribute to stability. The challenge will be to devise policies that take care of fundamental Western security interests, while at the same time recognizing Russian concerns.

An increased NATO profile in the High North should therefore be tailored not to provoke Russia, but to demonstrate Allied interest in the area. Key words here would be confidence building, cooperative activities and the development of common procedures. Such presence need not be permanent and threatening in the shape of military hardware and personnel, but tied to pre-planned training activities, exercises and visits.

Training and exercises are important elements of increased NATO involvement in the High North. We highly appreciate the participation of Allied and partner forces in exercising and training, particularly in North Norway. NATO is already - to a certain extent - present in the region today, primarily through the Integrated Air Defence System, including fighters on alert and routine AWACS early warning flights. Some exercise activity under the NATO flag also takes place in Norway and Iceland, but to a large extent such activities are bilateral or multilateral by invitation.

But there is room for more joint training on Norwegian territory. We can offer huge and uncontested training areas, with few peacetime restrictions. In dialogue with my Russian colleagues, I have been very clear to underline Norway´s and NATO’s right to train and exercise on the territory of Allies. And if we could involve Russia more in common regional activities, we will be able to counter expected negative rhetoric that NATO presence represents a threat to Russia. Through military presence in peace time, we also avoid that such presence in a crisis situation could lead to unnecessary escalation.

Increased focus on the High North could therefore be an excellent opportunity for NATO to engage in political and military confidence building and cooperative ventures with Russia. Here, the NATO-Russia Council could be the catalyst of NATO-Russia relations as originally intended. Also NATO should take a comprehensive approach to challenges in this area. We need to ensure that NATO develops a good working relationship with organisations like the Arctic Council, the UN, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the EU.

Situational awareness and understanding is always key to manage a crisis. NATO must therefore be familiar with relevant political-military issues in the High North. In the process of shaping the new Allied Command Structure, Norway has taken an initiative to connect national operational headquarters closer to NATO commands. We believe this is good use of national resources at a time when we seek to uphold the level of ambition, while reducing the number of headquarters and personnel. In line with this idea, our joint headquarters at Bodø is now linking up with the NATO Command Structure and establishing a mutual working relationship with relevant Allied headquarters. As a consequence, regional situational awareness and knowledge will be transferred to NATO, and our national headquarters will improve its interoperability with Allied commands.

Based on the arguments I have just presented, I believe that NATO should increase its focus on the High North. This should both be related to potential security challenges and to opportunities for cooperation. Thus, a NATO role must balance deterrence and defence with cooperation, and clearly bring out that use of military force in interstate disputes will be considered only as a last resort. A higher profile for the Alliance could lay the ground for extensive cooperation with Russia in areas of common interest.

II. Concluding remarks

To conclude, the primary mission of the Norwegian Armed Forces is at home.Focusing on the High North, protecting our rights and interests in our own neighbourhood is priority number one. That is also the rationale for our defence transformation and our capability development.

Security challenges in the High North are at the top of the Norwegian government’s policy agenda. Climate change, reduced ice coverage, new maritime transport routes and advances in offshore technology are key factors for the revival of the Arctic as a strategic focus area. We must prevent a re-militarisation of the area, but in my view, predictable military presence should be seen as a stabilising factor in the High North, not the opposite.

NATO will continue to be a cornerstone in Norwegian security. I also believe the Alliance will remain the primary multilateral security forum for dialogue between the US and Europe.A continuously adapting Alliance will also remain the primary organization for dealing with the full range of security issues for its member states.

A more active role for NATO in the High North must balance the signal of solidarity with cooperation, and lay the ground for interaction with Russia. The challenge will be to devise policies that take care of fundamental Western security interests, while at the same time recognizing Russian concerns.

Thank you for your attention!